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par Jorge DUANY 
Department of Sociology  
and Anthropology 
University of Puerto Rico,  
Río Piedras 
 
 
 
Cuba is one of the top migrant-sending countries to the United 
States. In 1996, the island represented the seventh source of all 
immigrants to that country (26 466 persons). Moreover, Cuba was the 
fourth country of origin of the foreign-born population of the United 
States in 1990. In that year, the U.S. Census Bureau found 1 053 197 
persons of Cuban ancestry, the second largest group of Hispanics after 
Mexicans and Puerto Ricans. In 1997, the Current Population Survey 
estimated that 1 258 000 Cubans were living in the United States1. The 
latter number represents about 11 percent of the island’s population. 
This massive, recent, and continuing flow of people has drawn much 
attention from the mass media, scholarly researchers, and policy-
makers, particularly in the context of Cold War tensions between Cuba 
and the United States. 
The Cuban exodus since 1959 can be divided into four main 
stages : the Golden Exile (1959-1962), the Freedom Flights (1965-
 
                                                          
1. U.S. Department of Justice, 1996, Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service, electronic document, http ://www.ins.usdoj.gov/-
stats/299.html, 1997 ; U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1990, Census of the Population of 
the United States, electronic document, http ://www.venus.census.gov.cdrom/lookup, 
1998 ; U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1997, Current Population Survey, electronic 
document, http ://www.census.gov.population/www/socdemo/hispanic/cps97, 1998. 
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1973), the Mariel boat lift (1980), and the balsero crisis (1994) (see 
Figure 1). In addition, one may trace the beginnings of large-scale 
Cuban emigration in the last third of the nineteenth century (1868-
1900) and its continuation during the first half of the twentieth (1900-
1958). This periodization highlights the shifting socioeconomic 
composition of the migrants, the impact of various junctures in the 
relations between the United States and Cuba, and the development of 
the Cuban Revolution itself. The Cuban-American population is 
extremely diverse in both class background and current status, partly as 
a result of the various phases of the Cuban diaspora. For instance, 
upper- and middle-class refugees predominated in the first two waves 
of the post-revolutionary exodus (1959-1962 and 1965-1973), while 
lower-class immigrants predominated in the latter two waves (1980 
and 1994). Lisandro Pérez has aptly compared the Cuban diaspora to 
the peeling of an onion, in which successive layers of migrants draw 
increasingly on the core of the Cuban population2. 
 
 
                                                          
2. See Pérez Lisandro, « Cubans in the United States », Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science 487, 1986, pp. 126-137. 
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Figure 1 
Stages in cuban migration to the united states since the cuban revolution 
Phase Dates Landmark events Estimated number of 
immigrants 
Golden Exile January 1959- 
October 1962 
From the triumph of the Revolution to the 
Missile Crisis 
250 000 
(22,9 % of the total) 
Suspension of regular 
migration 
November 1962-
November 1965 
From the end of the Missile Crisis to the 
opening of Camarioca port 
74 000    (6,8%) 
Freedom Flights December 1965- 
April 1973 
From the closing of Camarioca to the end of 
the airbridge 
300 000   (27,6%) 
Arrivals through other 
countries 
May 1973- 
March 1980 
From the end of the airbridge to the opening of 
Mariel harbor 
38 000    (3,5%) 
Mariel exodus April-September 1980 From the opening to the closing of Mariel 125 000   (11,5%) 
Renewal of regular 
migration 
October 1980- 
December 1991 
From the end of Mariel to the reduction of 
visas 
154 000   (14,2%) 
Increase in undocumented 
migration 
January 1992- 
July 1994 
From the reduction of visas to the balsero crisis 51 000    (4,7%) 
Balsero crisis August- 
September 1994 
From the lifting of Cuban restrictions to 
migrate to the U.S.-Cuban agreements 
36 000    (3,3%) 
Renewal of regular 
migration 
October 1994- 
December 1996 
From the U.S.-Cuban agreements to the present 60 000    (5,5%) 
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Another source of diversity within Cuban-American 
communities is geographic location. Before 1959, Cuban immigrants 
clustered in cigar-making centers like Ybor City and Key West in 
south Florida, and in New York City. Since 1959, Cubans in the 
United States have concentrated in four major types of settlements : (1) 
the Cuban ethnic enclave of Miami ; (2) the Cuban-American 
community of West New York-Union City, New Jersey ; (3) the 
middleman minority group in San Juan, Puerto Rico ; and (4) other 
communities scattered in New York, California, Illinois, and 
elsewhere. In addition, sizeable Cuban populations exist in Mexico, 
Venezuela, and Spain3. Each community has its own character, history, 
and relation with the host society. 
In this article, I will sketch the principal migration waves from 
Cuba to the United States during the twentieth century, especially since 
1959, and trace their historical background in the nineteenth century4. 
My focus will be on the changing socioeconomic characteristics of the 
migrants over time as well as their spatial distribution in the United 
States. I will show that, throughout the past four decades, the émigrés 
have become more and more representative of Cuban society with 
regard to income, occupation and education (but not so much with 
regard to race or color and region of origin-they are still predominantly 
white and urban). In the second part of the article, I will analyze the 
differences and similarities in the settlement patterns of Cubans in 
 
                                                          
3. The Cuban exile population outside the United States was estimated to be 
168 000 persons in 1994. See Milán Acosta Guillermo C., « Estimado de la población 
cubana residente en el exterior », in Universidad de La Habana, Centro de Estudios de 
Alternativas Políticas, Anuario CEAP 1995 : emigración cubana, Havana, CEAP, 
1996, pp. 11-17. 
4. This article incorporates and updates much of the material presented in my 
earlier texts on the topic. See Cobas José A. and Duany Jorge, Cubans in Puerto Rico : 
Ethnic Economy and Cultural Identity, Gainesville, University Press of Florida, 1997 ; 
Duany Jorge, « The Recent Cuban Exodus in Comparative Caribbean Perspective », in 
Tulchin Joseph S., Serbín Andrés, and Hernández Rafael (eds), Cuba and the 
Caribbean : Regional Issues and Trends in the Post-Cold War Era, Wilmington, Del., 
Scholarly Resources, 1997, pp. 141-162 ; and Duany Jorge, « The Fear of Illegal 
Aliens : Caribbean Migration as a National and Regional Security Threat », in Tulchin 
John S. (ed), Cooperative Security in the Caribbean, Wilmington, Del., Scholarly 
Resources, forthcoming. 
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Miami, West New York-Union City, San Juan, and other cities. In 
particular, I will argue that it is a mistake to take the ethnic enclave in 
Miami as the prototype for the experiences of all Cubans in exile. 
Actually, Cuban Miami represents a singular and probably unique case 
of immigrant settlement and adaptation. 
The third section of the essay will briefly examine the 
socioeconomic profile of the Cuban population in the United States 
and conclude that stereotyped images of its material success have little 
basis on academic research. Instead, Cuban-Americans face many of 
the same challenges as other recent immigrants in the United States 
and elsewhere. Among these challenges is the question of developing a 
hybrid cultural identity that maintains transnational linkages to the 
homeland as well as to the adopted country. My main thesis, which 
will be further developed in the final section of this article, is that the 
tendency among scholars and journalists to represent Cuban exiles as a 
prosperous and privileged group has led them to neglect key aspects of 
that community, such as the high degree of internal differentiation with 
regard to social class, political ideology, residential location, and other 
variables. As a result, more nuanced and finely grained portraits of the 
Cuban diaspora should take into account its socioeconomic diversity, 
historical complexity, and physical dispersion. 
HISTORICAL PHASES OF THE CUBAN DIASPORA 
The Pre-Revolutionary Cuban Exodus 
Prior to the Cuban Revolution of 1959, a steady stream of 
Cubans had moved to the United States. Large-scale emigration began 
in earnest with the Ten Years’ War in Cuba (1868-1878), accelerated 
during the Spanish-Cuban-American War (1895-1898), and proceeded 
during the twentieth century. Between 1869 and 1900, nearly 33 000 
Cuban immigrants were admitted in the United States (see Table 1). In 
the mid-1870s, some 12 000 Cubans resided there. Most of them were 
either political refugees or working-class migrants such as artisans and 
laborers in the tobacco industry. By the early 1900s, Cubans had 
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established immigrant colonies in Key West, Tampa, New York City, 
and New Orleans, mostly as a result of political and economic turmoil 
on the island5. 
 
Table 1 
Cuban immigrants admitted to the united states, 
1869-1996, by decades 
Years Number 
1869 -1870 3 090 
1871-1880 8 221 
1881-1890 21 528 
1891-1900 25 553 
1901-1910 44 211 
1911-1920 25 158 
1921-1930 15 901 
1931-1940 9 571 
1941-1950 26 313 
 
 
                                                          
5. On nineteenth-century migration from Cuba to the United States, see Pérez 
Louis A. Jr., « Cubans in Tampa : From Exiles to Immigrants, 1892-1901 », Florida 
Historical Quarterly 57, 1978, pp. 129-140 ; Poyo Gerald E., « With All, and for the 
Good of All : The Emergence of Popular Nationalism in the Cuban Communities of the 
United States, 1848-1898 », Durham, N.C., Duke University Press, 1989 ; Poyo Gerald 
E., « The Cuban Experience in the United States, 1865-1940 », Cuban Studies 21, 
1991, pp. 19-36 ; Pérez Lisandro, « Cuban Catholics in the United States », in Dolan 
Jay P. and Vidal Jaime R. (eds), Puerto Rican and Cuban Catholics in the U.S., 1900-
1965, Notre Dame, Ind., University of Notre Dame Press, 1994, pp. 147-247 ; and 
Nancy Raquel Mirabal, « “Con sus manos y sus ardientes corazones :” Race and 
Gender in the Cuban Migration and Settlement of Women in the U.S. During the Late 
Nineteenth Century and Early Twentieth Centuries », paper presented at the Second 
Annual South Florida Symposium on Cuba, Cuban Studies Association, Miami, 
September 13-14, 1997. 
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Years (continued) Number (continued) 
1951-1960 78 948 
1961-1970 208 536 
1971-1980 264 863 
1981-1990 144 578 
1991-1996 94 936 
Total 971 407 
 
Sources : U.S. Department of Justice, 1996, Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration 
and Naturalization Service ; Pérez, « Cuban Catholics in the United States ». 
 
During the first three decades of the twentieth century, several 
crises in the international market for sugar and tobacco, as well as 
violent upheavals in the fragile Cuban republic, caused large 
movements of people to the United States. Emigration was 
substantially reduced during Gerardo Machado’s dictatorship (1924-
1933) and the Great Depression. In the 1930s, the number of Cubans 
admitted to the United States declined to less than 10 000 persons. 
However, the Cuban tradition of sending political exiles to the north 
continued unabated. During the 1940s and 1950s, tens of thousands of 
Cubans sought better economic opportunities and political refuge in 
the United States. This is the period recreated in the semi-biographic 
accounts of Miguel Barnet, La vida real (1984), and Oscar Hijuelos, 
The Mambo Kings Play Songs of Love (1989). The migration of Cuban 
musicians, artists, and athletes was especially noteworthy. By 1958, 
about 40 000 Cubans lived in the United States, mostly in New York 
City6. Out of nearly one million Cuban immigrants registered between 
 
                                                          
6. Barnet Miguel, La vida real, Madrid, Alianza, 1984 ; Hijuelos Oscar, The 
Mambo Kings Play Songs of Love, New York, Farrar, Strauss, Giroux, 1989 ; Pérez, 
« Cuban Catholics in the United States », op. cit. ; Boswell Thomas D. and Curtis 
James R., The Cuban-American Experience : Culture, Images, and Perspectives, 
Totowa, N.J., Rowman & Allanheld, 1984, p. 41. 
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1869 and 1996, 258 494 or almost 27 percent arrived before 1960. 
Thus, the exodus had a history of almost one hundred years on the eve 
of the Cuban Revolution.  
The Golden Exile, 1959-1962 
The massive flow of Cuban refugees began with the overthrow 
of Fulgencio Batista’s dictatorship (1952-1958). Starting in January, 
1959, the first to leave the country were the military officers, political 
leaders, government workers, large landowners, and entrepreneurs 
closely identified with Batista. As the Revolution became progressi-
vely more radical, disillusioned members of the middle class such as 
professionals, technicians, managers, and administrators joined the 
diaspora. Many of these groups were negatively affected by revolutio-
nary policies geared toward the redistribution of wealth, such as 
agrarian reform, urban housing reform, and nationalization of foreign 
assets7. The period from 1959 to 1962 has been dubbed the « Golden 
Exile » because most of the refugees came from the upper and middle 
strata of Cuban society. The majority were urban, middle-aged, well-
educated, light-skinned, and white-collar workers. At this stage, 
political, social, and religious reasons were the primary motivations to 
leave the country. Nearly 23 percent of all Cuban exiles (or 250 000 
persons) fled to the United States during the first wave of post-
revolutionary migration8. 
 
                                                          
7. For historical overviews of the Cuban Revolution, see Thomas Hugh, The 
Cuban Revolution, New York, Harper, 1977 ; Azicri Max, Cuba : Politics, Economics, 
and Society, London, Pinter, 1988 ; Pérez-Stable Marifeli, The Cuban Revolution : 
Origins, Course, and Legacy, New York, Oxford University Press, 1993 ; and Mesa-
Lago Carmelo, Breve historia económica de Cuba socialista, Madrid, Alianza, 1994. 
8. For studies of this period, see Fagen Richard, Brody Richard A. and O’Leary 
Thomas, Cubans in Exile : Disaffection and the Revolution, Stanford, Stanford 
University Press, 1967 ; Portes Alejandro, « Dilemmas of a Golden Exile : Integration 
of Cuban Refugee Families in Milwaukee », American Sociological Review 49, n° 3, 
1969, pp. 383-397 ; Amaro Nelson and Portes Alejandro, « Notas para una sociología 
del exilio : situación y perspectivas de los grupos cubanos en EEUU », Aportes 23, 
1972, pp. 7-24 ; Clark Juan M., The Exodus from Revolutionary Cuba (1959-1974) : A 
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Until january, 1961, when the U.S. government broke diploma-
tic relations with Castro’s Cuba, exiles could fly directly from Havana 
to Miami on commercial flights. Between 1 600 and 1 700 Cubans 
arrived in the United States per week during this period9. The refugees 
consisted primarily of nuclear families admitted to the United States on 
a temporary basis (through visa waivers) because they thought they 
would soon return home. They tended to remain in Miami because of 
its geographical proximity to Cuba, because of the exiles’ prior 
familiarity with Florida, and because that city became the center of 
anti-Castro activity. In april, 1961, the military fiasco of the Bay of 
Pigs invasion initiated a new era in Cuban exile politics : the 
Revolution was here to stay ; exile was no longer a transitory status.  
The Cuban Missile Crisis of october, 1962, interrupted the large-
scale migration of Cubans to the United States. Illegal migration 
correspondingly increased, mostly by small craft and makeshift 
vessels ; an estimated 6 700 boat people (balseros) arrived in Florida 
between 1962 and 196510. In addition, nearly 56 000 Cubans migrated 
to the United States from other countries like Mexico and Spain, which 
maintained diplomatic relations with Cuba. In the aftermath of the Bay 
of Pigs invasion and the Missile Crisis, tensions between Cuba and the 
United States escalated even further. Commercial transportation 
between the two countries was suspended until september, 1965, when 
the Cuban government unilaterally opened the port of Camarioca, 
allowing some 5 000 persons to leave the country. 
                                                          
 
Sociological Analysis, Ph. D. dissertation, University of Florida, 1975 ; Comité Estatal 
de Estadísticas (República de Cuba), Estadísticas de migraciones externas y turismo, 
Havana, Editorial Orbe, 1982 ; Pedraza-Bailey Silvia, « Cuba’s Exiles : Portrait of a 
Refugee Migration », International Migration Review 19, n° 1 (1985), pp. 4-34 ; and 
Pedraza Silvia, « Cuba’s Refugees : Manifold Migrations », in Pedraza Silvia and 
Rumbaut Rubén G. (eds), Origins and Destinies : Immigration, Race, and Ethnicity in 
America, Belmont, Ca., Wadsworth, 1996, pp. 263-279. 
9. U.S. Department of Justice, Our Immigration : A Brief Account of Immigration 
into the United States, Washington D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978,  
p. 18. 
10. Ackerman Holly and Clark Juan M., The Cuban Balseros : Voyage of 
Uncertainty, Miami, Cuban American National Council, 1995. 
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The Freedom Flights, 1965-1973 
Camarioca ushered in a new migration wave from Cuba to the 
United States. Diplomatic negotiations between Washington and 
Havana created an airlift between Varadero and Miami from decem-
ber, 1965, to april, 1973 : the so-called Freedom Flights that took from 
3 000 to 4 000 Cuban refugees per month to the United States. This 
stage totaled about 300 000 refugees, nearly 28 percent of the exodus 
between 1959 and 199611. Most Freedom Flights exiles had relatives 
already living in the United States, so that kinship networks played an 
important role in the process of migration and resettlement. So did the 
Cuban Refugee Program, established in 1961, which helped relocate 
many of the exiles outside Miami and eased their transition to a new 
life. 
A change in the socioeconomic composition of the émigré 
population was well under way by 1973. Although the exiles still over-
represented the upper social strata, they were more diverse with regard 
to income, occupation, education, and residence in Cuba. As the 
proportion of professionals and managers among the émigrés declined, 
the proportion of blue-collar and service workers increased12. Shifts in 
the refugee flow reflected the growing impact of revolutionary 
programs on wider segments of the Cuban population, such as small-
scale vendors and artisans13. During this stage, the middle and lower 
occupational sectors – such as clerical and sales employees – came to 
predominate among Cubans in the United States. Like their immediate 
predecessors, the migrants settled primarily in the Miami metropolitan 
area, recreating the heterogeneous social structure of their homeland 
almost entirely. By 1970, Miami had replaced New York as the capital 
of Cuban America. 
 
                                                          
11. U.S. Department of Justice, Our Immigration, op. cit., p. 18 ; Clark, op. cit. 
12. Portes Alejandro, Clark Juan M. and Bach Robert L., « The New Wave : A 
Statistical Profile of Recent Cuban Exiles to the United States », Cuban Studies/ 
Estudios cubanos 7, n° 1, 1977, pp. 1-32. 
13. In March-April, 1968, for example, the so-called « Revolutionary Offensive » 
nationalized more than 58 000 small businesses, such as street food outlets, restaurants, 
and bars. See Pérez-Stable, op. cit., pp. 117-118 ; Azicri, op. cit., p. 132. 
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In april, 1973, the Freedom Flights ended, reducing Cuban 
migration to a mere trickle. Only about 38 000 Cubans arrived in the 
United States between 1973 and 1979, mostly via other countries, 
including Jamaica and Venezuela, which reestablished diplomatic 
relations with Cuba14. This group of migrants had two major 
destinations – Miami and New York – where they could find relatives 
and friends, as well as work. Although the exodus slowed down during 
this period, it displayed an increasing socioeconomic diversity. By the 
end of the 1970s, ideological and material incentives to emigrate were 
practically inseparable15. Cubans increasingly resembled labor 
migrants from countries such as Mexico or the Dominican Republic, 
driven abroad by their desire to improve their standards of living. The 
main difference was that the U.S. government defined Cubans as 
political refugees and most of the others as economic migrants16. 
The Mariel Exodus of 1980 
The mass migration of Cubans from Mariel harbor to Key West, 
Florida, took place between april and september of 1980. The sudden 
and dramatic outflow partly resulted from the visits of more than 
100 000 exiles to Cuba in 1979, which familiarized their relatives with 
economic opportunities in the United States. The immediate cause of 
the boat lift was the take-over of the Peruvian embassy in Havana by 
more than 10 000 Cubans. Fidel Castro resented that the Peruvian 
government failed to return some Cubans who had invaded the 
embassy requesting political asylum. So he removed its police custody 
and exhorted all those wishing to leave the country to go to the 
embassy. In a reprise of Camarioca, the Cuban government opened the 
 
                                                          
14. Boswell and Curtis, op. cit., p. 50. 
15. Bach Robert L., « The New Cuban Exodus : Political and Economic 
Motivations », Caribbean Review 11, n° 2, 1982, pp. 22-25, 58-60 ; Portes Alejandro 
and Bach Robert L., Latin Journey : Cuban and Mexican Immigrants in the United 
States, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1985. 
16. Pedraza-Bailey Silvia, Political and Economic Migrants in America : Cubans 
and Mexicans, Austin, University of Texas Press, 1985. 
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port of Mariel, near Havana, for those who could be picked up by 
relatives living abroad. When the exiles arrived in Mariel on boats and 
ships, the Cuban government forced them to take unrelated persons, 
some of whom had spent time in prisons and mental hospitals. 
Contrary to media reports, less than two percent of the marie-
litos (as they were pejoratively labeled) were common criminals, 
although about 25 percent had been in jail for various reasons, 
including violating the Cuban law of peligrosidad, or « dangerous 
behavior » such as engaging in public homosexuality, vagrancy, and 
antisocial acts17. Approximately 125 000 Cubans arrived in Key West 
during the Mariel boat lift, representing about 12 percent of the exodus 
between 1959 and 1996. Most of the marielitos were young, single 
males ; many were black or mulatto ; the majority were of working-
class background and had less than a high-school education. In 
Havana, the government officially branded the refugees as escoria 
(scum) and lumpen because it considered them antisocial and counter-
revolutionary elements. In Miami, where most of the marielitos 
eventually settled, the exodus deepened the rifts between « old » and 
« new » immigrants. Date of departure from Cuba – before or after 
1980 – became a symbol of one’s social status. The diminutive term 
marielito itself reflected the public scorn accorded to the new 
immigrants, both in Cuba and in the United States. 
The Mariel exodus transformed Miami’s Cuban community. 
Approximately 13 percent of the marielitos was classified as black or 
mulatto, compared to only three percent of the exiles in 1973. The 
occupational structure of Cuban Miami became even more hetero-
geneous than before as more blue-collar and service workers entered 
the local labor market. Mariel refugees faced longer periods of 
unemployment, low-paid work, and welfare dependence than earlier 
 
                                                          
17. Clark Juan M., Lasaga José I. and Roque Rose M., The 1980 Mariel Exodus : 
An Assessment and Prospect, Washington, D.C., Council for Inter-American Security, 
1981, p. 7. Based on Cuban sources, two Cuban researchers estimated that over 45 
percent of the marielitos had criminal record, but 40 percent of those « crimes » would 
not be penalized in the United States. See Hernández Rafael and Gomis Redis, 
« Retrato del Mariel : el ángulo socioeconómico », Cuadernos de Nuestra América 3, 
n° 5, 1986, pp. 124-151. 
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migrants18. As a result of the Mariel exodus, the exile community in 
Miami became much more representative of the entire Cuban 
population. Furthermore, « the sudden influx of more than 85 000 
Mariel refugees in the Miami area has created major problems in 
housing, unemployment, and apparently crime as well »19. As 
Alejandro Portes has pointed out, « The few thousand delinquents and 
mental patients put by the Cuban government aboard the boats 
stigmatized not only the entire Mariel exodus, but the pre-Mariel exile 
population as well »20. In 1981, a Gallup poll showed that Americans 
perceived Cubans to be the second less desirable group of neighbors 
after religious cult members21. 
Cuban emigration slowed down after 1980 because the U.S. 
government no longer considered all Cubans to be political refugees. 
Between 1981 and 1990, about 145 000 Cuban immigrants were 
admitted to the United States, compared to nearly 265 000 during the 
1970s22. After Mariel, Cubans were labeled « entrants (status 
pending) », an ambivalent category that placed them in a legal limbo 
for an indefinite period and did not provide the special benefits 
accorded to those granted political asylum. To qualify as refugees, 
applicants had to prove a « well-founded fear of persecution » in their 
home country. Only some groups of Cubans, such as former political 
prisoners, were now eligible for refugee status. Most were labor 
migrants, such as blue-collar and service workers, reflecting the 
socioeconomic composition of the Cuban composition more accurately 
than before. Ideological dissidence with Castro’s policies was less 
common among the émigrés of this period. 
 
                                                          
18. Portes Alejandro, Clark Juan M. and Manning Robert D., « After Mariel : A 
Survey of the Resettlement Experiences of 1980 Cuban Refugees in Miami », Cuban 
Studies/Estudios cubanos 15, n° 2, 1985, pp. 37-59. 
19. Clark et al., op. cit., p. 12. 
20. Portes Alejandro, « The Rise of Ethnicity : Determinants of Ethnic Percep-
tions Among Cuban Exiles in Miami », American Sociological Review 49, n° 3, 1984, 
p. 394. 
21. The Miami Herald, January 21, 1982, p. 15A. 
22. U.S. Department of Justice, 1996, Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service, op. cit. 
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Migration remained a thorny issue in U.S.-Cuban relations 
during the 1980s. In december, 1984, both governments signed an 
agreement allowing the migration of up to 20 000 Cubans per year. But 
the Cuban government quickly suspended the agreement to protest the 
launching of Radio Martí in Miami in may, 1985. Consequently, 
thousands of Cubans moved to other countries, such as Panama and 
Jamaica, where they hoped to obtain visas to the United States. Others 
attempted to reach Florida by boat or overstayed their temporary visit 
permits. The stage was set for another migratory crisis. 
The Balsero Crisis of 1994 
After a sharp decline in the 1980s, the exodus recovered its pace 
during the 1990s as a result of growing economic and political hard-
ship in Cuba. Between 1991 and 1996, a total of 94 936 Cuban 
immigrants were admitted to the United States. In addition, 13 147 
rafters arrived from Cuba between january of 1991 and july of 199423. 
In august of 1994, the number of refugees broke all records since the 
Mariel exodus. By the end of that month, the U.S. Coast Guard had 
rescued 21 300 Cubans near the coast of Florida. The so-called balsero 
crisis involved about 36 000 Cuban rafters interdicted at sea at the 
height of the exodus between august 13 and september 13, 1994. 
Technically, the balseros were undocumented migrants because 
they left Cuba without authorization. Until august, 1994, the U.S. 
government had welcomed them as political refugees fleeing Castro’s 
authoritarian regime. However, the Clinton administration increasingly 
perceived the balsero crisis as a national security threat that could 
quickly become « another Mariel » : that is, a prolonged, massive, and 
chaotic boat lift from Cuba to the United States. To prevent such a 
situation, President Clinton decided to return all future refugees to 
Cuba. From the standpoint of the Cuban government, the crisis also 
had the potential to destabilize the island’s internal security and 
 
                                                          
23. U.S. Department of Justice, 1996, Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service, op. cit. ; Ackerman and Clark, op. cit. 
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international image, as the august 5, 1994 riots in downtown Havana 
clearly showed. Both governments therefore moved swiftly to address 
the crisis through a series of bilateral measures, beginning in septem-
ber, 1994. In may, 1995, the U.S. and Cuban governments renewed the 
1984 agreement to allow the migration of 20 000 Cubans per year, in 
addition to a special lottery of 5 000 new visa applications. The 
balsero crisis had been temporarily solved. 
The immediate antecedents of the crisis are clear in hindsight. In 
july, 1991, the U.S. State Department announced the temporary 
suspension of tourist visas for Cubans due to a backlog of 28 000 
applications. Many Cubans overstayed these visas and did not go back 
home, thus becoming undocumented immigrants in the United States. 
Moreover, the U.S. Interests Section in Havana only granted 3 250 
immigrant visas between 1991 and 199324. Illegal exits from Cuba 
therefore became the primary means of migrating to the United States 
during the early 1990s. These were the worst years of the so-called 
Special Period in Time of Peace in Cuba, characterized by a sharp 
decline in economic growth, a dramatic decrease in living standards, a 
rise in social tensions, and unmet demands for political reform25. 
Migratory pressures accumulated rapidly, including large sectors of the 
Cuban population, such as service workers, professionals, and the 
growing unemployed. In august, 1994, when the Cuban government 
temporarily lifted all restrictions to leave the country, thousands of 
Cubans attempted to do so on improvised boats and rafts, especially 
from the port of Cojímar, near Havana. Cuban scholars have recently 
 
                                                          
24. Rodríguez Chávez Ernesto, Emigración cubana actual, Havana, Editorial de 
Ciencias Sociales, 1997. 
25. For surveys of the economic crisis in Cuba during the 1990s, see Rodríguez 
Beruff Jorge (ed), Cuba en crisis : perspectivas económicas y políticas, Río Piedras, 
Editorial de la Universidad de Puerto Rico, 1995 ; Hoffman Bert (ed), Cuba : apertura 
y reforma económica. Perfil de un debate, Caracas, Nueva Sociedad, 1995 ; Carranza 
Valdés Julio, Gutiérrez Urdaneta Luis, and Monreal González Pedro, Cuba : la 
reestructuración de la economía. Una propuesta para el debate, Caracas, Nueva 
Sociedad, 1997 ; Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe, La economía 
cubana : reformas estructurales y desempeño en los noventa, Mexico City, Fondo de 
Cultura Económica, 1997. 
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estimated that between 636 000 and a million more Cubans would 
migrate if allowed to do so26. 
In the 1990s, material deprivation and family reunification 
became increasingly salient reasons for migration27. Thus, the contem-
porary Cuban diaspora is less of a politically motivated exile and more 
of an economically motivated migration, as in much of the Caribbean 
region. A recent sample of balseros, detained in their attempt to leave 
Cuba, still over-represented the white, male, urban, and educated 
population of the island28. Most of the respondents were manual 
workers, especially in transportation and communications, although 
many were professionals, technicians, and administrators. The majority 
said they wanted to leave the country for economic or personal 
reasons29 ; most had relatives and friends living abroad. A surprising 
proportion (21 percent) were members of the Cuban Communist Party 
or the Communist Youth Union ; not surprisingly, nearly a third (29 
percent) were unemployed. Altogether, the data suggest that current 
emigration reflects the profound economic crisis that affects all strata 
of Cuban society. 
The United States continued to accept unauthorized migrants 
from Cuba until august 19, 1994, when President Clinton ordered the 
U.S. Coast Guard to transfer the rafters to U.S. military bases in 
 
                                                          
26. Aja Díaz Antonio, Milán Acosta Guillermo C. and Díaz Fernández Marta, « La 
emigración cubana de cara al futuro : estimación de su potencial migratorio y algunas 
reflexiones en torno a la representación de los jóvenes en su composición », in 
Universidad de La Habana, Anuario CEAP 1995, op. cit., pp. 142-163 ; Rodríguez 
Chávez Ernesto, « El flujo emigratorio cubano, 1984-1995 : balance y perspectivas », 
paper presented at the workshop on « The Caribbean Diaspora : The Present Context 
and Future Trends », University of Puerto Rico, Río Piedras, May 2, 1997. 
27. Rodríguez Chávez, op. cit. ; Martín Consuelo and Pérez (Guadalupe), Familia, 
emigración y vida cotidiana en Cuba, Havana, Editora Política, 1998 ; Arboleya 
(Jesús), Havana Miami : The US-Cuba Migration Conflict, Melbourne, Australia, 
Ocean Press, 1996. 
28. Martínez Milagros et al., « Los balseros cubanos : un estudio a partir de las 
salidas ilegales », Havana, Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, 1996. 
29. Once in Guantánamo or in the United States, most rafters say that their primary 
motivation was the desire for freedom and release from state control. See Ackerman 
and Clark, op. cit., pp. 30-31. 
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Guantánamo and Panama. Thus, the Clinton administration reversed 
the traditional open-door stance toward Cuban migration and began a 
series of major policy shifts, such as intercepting, detaining, and 
repatriating the rafters. This transformation in the official treatment of 
Cubans in the United States signaled an attempt – not entirely 
successful – to develop a coherent immigration and refugee policy in 
the post-Cold War period. More particularly, it was a political response 
by the Clinton administration to long-standing criticism of U.S. 
preference toward Cuban over Haitian boat people. Hence, analysts 
have begun to write about the « Haitianization » or « Caribbea-
nization » of U.S. Cuban migration policy30. For the first time since 
1959, Cubans leaving their country without visas were considered 
illegal aliens subject to deportation, just like Haitians, Dominicans, or 
Salvadoreans. This policy shift represents the beginning of the end of 
the special status of Cuban immigrants in the United States. 
In sum, the Cuban exodus has undergone several distinct stages 
during the past four decades. Emigration began with the disaffected 
sectors of the Cuban Revolution, initially concentrated in the most 
privileged groups of pre-revolutionary society (especially urban, upper 
– and middle – class whites). But the subsequent deterioration in U.S.-
Cuban relations, together with faltering economic conditions on the 
island, produced a much more heterogeneous Cuban-American popula-
tion in its social, economic, and political origins. This trend toward the 
diversification of Cuban émigrés became evident during the Freedom 
Flights (1965-1973) and especially after Mariel (1980). During this 
period, working-class, dark-skinned, and rural migrants left Cuba in 
larger numbers than before. In the 1990s, the economic crisis deepened 
the migratory potential and even impacted formerly pro-revolutionary 
segments of the population. Except for peasants and blacks, current 
émigrés represent a wide cross-section of Cuban society. Finally, 
economic motives have become as important as political ones during 
the latter phases of the exodus. 
 
                                                          
30. Duany, « The Recent Cuban Exodus », op. cit. ; Rodríguez Chávez, op. cit. ; 
Grosfoguel Ramón, « Migration and Geopolitics in the Greater Antilles », Review 20, 
n° 1, 1997, pp. 115-145. 
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CUBAN-AMERICAN COMMUNITIES :  
SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES 
Within their primary places of destination, Cuban immigrants 
have carved out distinctive niches, especially in south Florida, 
northeastern New Jersey, and the metropolitan area of New York. In 
1990, the top five Cuban settlements in the United States were Miami, 
Los Angeles, West New York-Union City, New York City, and Tampa 
(see Table 2). In addition, a smaller number of Cubans (about 17 000) 
lives in San Juan, Puerto Rico. Cuban communities are also notable in 
Madrid, Caracas, and Mexico City, but little has been published about 
them31. For some time now, Miami has had more Cuban residents than 
Santiago de Cuba, Cuba’s second city. Outside of Miami, West New 
York-Union City in New Jersey is the single largest Cuban settlement 
in the United States, although the Los Angeles-Anaheim-Riverside 
consolidated metropolitan area now has more Cuban residents. 
 
 
Table 2 
Geographic distribution of the cuban population 
in the united states, 1990 
 
State Number of Cubans Percent of Cubans 
Florida 675 786 64,2 
New Jersey 87 085 8,3 
New York 77 016 7,3 
California 75 034 7,1 
Illinois 17 165 1,6 
Other states 121 111 11,5 
Total 1 053 197 100,0 
 
                                                          
31. See Martín Consuelo and Romano Vicente, La emigración cubana en España, 
Madrid, Fundación de Investigaciones Marxistas, 1994 ; Aja Díaz Antonio, « La 
comunidad cubana en Venezuela », paper presented at the International Workshop on 
« The Cuban Community Abroad : Profiles and Processes in the Nineties », Center for 
the Study of Policy Alternatives, University of Havana, June 20-22, 1996. 
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State Number of Cubans Percent of Cubans 
Metropolitan area 
Miami, Florida 561 868 53,3 
Los Angeles, California 60 302 5,7 
Union City-West New York,  
New Jersey 
57 604 5,5 
New York, New York 57 019 5,4 
Tampa, Florida 33 933 3,2 
Other areas 282 471 26,8 
Total 1 053 197 100,0 
 
Source : U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1990, Census of the Population of the United 
States. 
 
Each of these communities remains connected to the Cuban 
homeland through specific spatial practices, such as renaming streets 
and schools, establishing businesses with the same names as in the 
home country, redecorating inner and outer spaces, establishing 
hometown associations, and organizing parades and festivals based on 
Cuban traditions. In Little Havana, Cubans rechristened Calle Ocho in 
honor of the Miami Sound Machine. In San Juan, they built 
condominiums with Cuban names like Varadero and Comodoro, and 
opened restaurants like Kasalta or Havana’s. In Union City, Mariel 
refugees recently organized a rumba group at the Esquina Habanera 
restaurant32. In Madrid as well as in San Juan and earlier in Tampa, the 
émigrés formed social clubs like Casa Cuba ; and in Caracas, they 
founded the Church-supported Unión de Cubanos en el Exilio, which 
soon expanded to Miami, Union City, and other centers of the 
diaspora. Initially deterritorialized identities have taken hold across 
national boundaries through such settlement patterns.  
In Miami as well as in New York City, Cuban immigrants tend 
to live apart from non-Hispanic whites, blacks, and even other 
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identidad en Nueva York », Temas 10, 1997, pp. 13-21. 
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Latinos33. Even where they share the same neighborhoods with other 
ethnic and racial groups – such as Nicaraguans in Sweetwater or 
Colombians in Queens –, Cubans tend to remain socially encapsulated 
in their own communities. Although residential segregation has many 
pernicious effects, it allows for the consolidation of Cuban barrios and 
the transformation of the urban landscape along transnational lines. It 
also makes possible some degree of political representation through 
concentration in certain electoral districts. Since the 1970s, Cubans in 
the United States have been increasingly empowered, partly as a result 
of their extreme clustering in south Florida and northern New Jersey.  
Miami’s Cuban Enclave 
With nearly 562 000 Cubans in 1990, Miami is the undisputed 
center of the Cuban exile. Little Havana stretches across scores of 
blocks southwest of downtown Miami, around Calle Ocho, toward the 
suburban area that Cubans affectionately call la sagüesera. Another 
large Cuban enclave is found in Hialeah to the north of Dade County. 
In 1990, sixteen percent of all Cubans in the county lived in the core of 
Little Havana and another 22 percent lived in Hialeah34. In Miami, 
Cuban-American culture thrives through numerous commercial 
Spanish-language signs and mass media, coffee shops, grocery stores, 
restaurants, social clubs, political organizations, Catholic and Afro-
Cuban yard shrines, artistic and musical activities, and the popular 
Calle Ocho Festival. The shrine to Our Lady of Charity, the patron of 
 
                                                          
33. Boswell Thomas D., The Cubanization and Hispanicization of Metropolitan 
Miami, Miami, Cuban American National Council, 1995 ; Conway Dennis, Bigby 
Ualthan and Swann Ronald S., « Caribbean Migrant Experiences in New York City », 
paper presented at the XIII International Congress of the Latin American Studies 
Association, Boston, Massachusetts, October 1986. 
34. Boswell, The Cubanization and Hispanicization of Metropolitan Miami, op. 
cit. 
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Cuba, located in downtown Miami, embodies the diasporic identity of 
Cubans in exile35. 
The Cubans of Miami have formed a tightly knit community that 
resists physical and cultural dispersion. Kenneth Wilson and Alejandro 
Portes associate this pattern of residential segregation with the enclave 
economy and its high proportion of Cuban-owned businesses that 
prefer to hire Cuban employees and serve mainly the needs of the 
émigré community. In several essays, Portes has defined the enclave as 
a spatial concentration of ethnic enterprises and residences with a wide 
variety of economic activities and a large ethnic market that competes 
with the dominant economy36. According to this definition, the Cuban 
enclave of Miami has expanded dramatically over the past four 
decades. In 1977, Cubans owned 7 336 businesses in the Miami-
Hialeah area, most of them in services, retail trade, and construction. 
By 1992, Cubans owned 46 900 firms in the Miami metropolitan area. 
 
                                                          
35. Tweed Thomas A., Our Lady of Exile : Diasporic Religion at a Cuban 
Catholic Shrine in Miami, New York, Oxford University Press, 1997. For recent 
studies of Cuban Miami, see González Pando Miguel, The Cuban Americans, 
Westport, Conn., Greenwood Press, 1998 ; García María Cristina, Havana USA : 
Cuban Exiles and Cuban Americans in South Florida, 1959-1994, Berkeley, 
University of California Press, 1996 ; Pérez-Firmat Gustavo, Life on the Hyphen : The 
Cuban-American Way, Austin, University of Texas Press, 1994 ; Portes Alejandro and 
Stepick Alex, City on the Edge : The Transformation of Miami, Berkeley, University 
of California Press, 1993 ; Grenier Guillermo and Stepick Alex III (eds), Miami Now ! 
Immigration, Ethnicity, and Social Change, Gainesville, University Press of Florida, 
1992 ; and Jorge Antonio, Suchlicki Jaime and Leyva de Varona Adolfo (eds), Cuban 
Exiles in Florida : Their Presence and Contribution, Miami, University of Miami, 
North-South Center, 1991. 
36. Wilson Kenneth and Portes Alejandro, « Immigrant Enclaves : An Analysis of 
the Labor Market Experiences of Cubans in Miami », American Journal of Sociology 
86, n° 2, 1980, pp. 295-319 ; Portes and Bach, op. cit. ; Portes Alejandro and Manning 
Robert D., « The Immigrant Enclave : Theory and Empirical Examples », in Nagel 
Joane and Ozlak Susan (eds), Competitive Ethnic Relations, Orlando, Fla., Academic 
Press, 1986, pp. 47-68 ; Portes Alejandro, « The Social Origins of the Cuban Enclave 
of Miami », Sociological Perspectives 30, n° 4, 1987, pp. 340-372 ; Portes Alejandro 
and Jensen Leif, « What’s an Ethnic Enclave ? The Case for Conceptual Clarity », 
American Sociological Review 52, 1987, pp. 768-770. 
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The city now has the second largest concentration of Hispanic-owned 
businesses in the United States after Los Angeles37. 
Although the exiles’ political activities continue to focus on 
Cuba, they show increasingly more interest in the United States. 
Because less than half of Miami’s Cubans were U.S. citizens in 1978, 
they held few elective offices and had little bargaining power relative 
to their numbers. By 1997, more than half of all foreign-born Cubans 
in the United States had become U.S. citizens38. Once they naturalize 
and register to vote, Cuban-Americans tend to support the Republican 
Party and its conservative ideology. The exiles have recently organized 
as a pressure group to defend their interests in U.S. society. As a result, 
their voice has been heard more clearly in local, state, and national 
arenas. In 1985, for example, the city of Miami elected its first Cuban 
mayor, Xavier Suárez. With the establishment of the Cuban American 
National Foundation in 1981, the exiles’ political clout in Washington 
increased considerably, particularly during the Reagan and Bush 
administrations. During the 1980s, three Cuban Americans were 
elected to the U.S. House of Representatives, two from southern 
Florida (Lincoln Díaz-Balart and Ileana Ros-Lehtinen) and one from 
New Jersey (Bob Menéndez). 
West New York-Union City, New Jersey 
The second Cuban concentration in the United States is in 
Hudson County, New Jersey, across from New York City. In 1990, 
nearly 58 000 Cubans lived in the West New York-Union City area, 
where a Cuban community has existed even before 1959. Here, too, the 
exiles have created a strong ethnic community that protects them from 
personal and social disorganization, although scholars have debated 
 
                                                          
37. Díaz-Briquets Sergio, « Cuban-Owned Businesses in the United States », 
Cuban Studies/Estudios cubanos 14, n° 2, 1984, pp. 57-64 ; U.S. Bureau of the 
Census, Survey of Minority-Owned Business Enterprises : Hispanic, Washington, 
D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996. 
38. U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1997 Current Population Survey, op. cit. 
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whether they have constituted an economic enclave such as the one in 
Miami. For instance, the residential pattern of Cubans in West New 
York-Union City is much more dispersed than in Miami, and their 
occupational distribution is much more concentrated in blue-collar jobs 
in light manufacturing. At any rate, the Bergenline Avenue of Union 
City bustles with Cuban restaurants, grocery stores, bakeries, music 
stores, and other businesses catering primarily to Cuban émigrés39. 
Cubans in northeastern New Jersey are primarily employed as 
factory operatives and service workers. Many were members of the 
lower class in Cuba, but others were professionals and managers who 
were forced to accept lower-status jobs in the United States. As Rafael 
Prohías and Lourdes Casal put it, « The high percentage of blue-collar 
and manual workers in West New York suggests a community in 
which emigration has meant an even more catastrophic loss of status 
than for Miami refugees »40. However, initial downward occupational 
mobility has been a common experience for Cubans in the United 
States, especially those arriving in the early 1960s. 
The Cuban community in West New York-Union City remains 
strongly identified with its culture of origin. This allegiance to Cuban 
identity is partly due to the predominance of foreign-born immigrants, 
but also to the proliferation of Cuban organizations in the area. West 
New York-Union City has many Cuban-owned businesses41 ; several 
 
                                                          
39. On Cubans in West New York-Union City, see Rogg Eleanor Meyer, The 
Assimilation of Cuban Exiles : The Role of Community and Class, New York, 
Aberdeen, 1974 ; Rogg Eleanor Meyer and Santana Cooney Rosemary, Adaptation 
and Adjustment of Cubans : West New York, New Jersey, New York, Fordham 
University, Hispanic Research Center, 1980 ; Prieto Yolanda, « Cuban Women in the 
U.S. Labor Force : Perspectives on the Nature of Change », Cuban Studies 17, 1987, 
pp. 73-92 ; Knauer Lisa Maya, « Eating in Cuban : Place-Making, Consumption and 
Imagined Geographies », unpublished manuscript, Program in American Studies, New 
York University, 1998. 
40. Prohías Rafael J. and Casal Lourdes, The Cuban Minority in the U.S. : 
Preliminary Report on Need Identification and Program Evaluation, Washington, 
D.C., Cuban National Planning Council, 1974, p. 65. 
41. In 1992, the Jersey City and Bergen-Passaic metropolitan areas of New Jersey 
had 2 705 Cuban-owned businesses. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Survey of Minority-
Owned Business Enterprises, op. cit. 
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newspapers and tabloids like La Tribuna, El Clarín, and Ultima Hora ; 
a host of Church-related voluntary associations, like the Unión de 
Cubanos en el Exilio ; and even right-wing terrorist organizations like 
Omega 7. The net result of all these ethnic associations has been to 
slow down the exiles’ cultural assimilation while fostering their 
adaptation to American society. Just as Miami is known for its Little 
Havana, West New York-Union City is known for its Little Santa 
Clara, because many migrants from the former province of Las Villas 
(now Villa Clara) have settled in the area42. 
Other Cuban Communities in the United States 
In other cities, such as Los Angeles or Chicago, Cubans are 
more affluent but more thoroughly acculturated to American society 
than in either Miami or West New York. In Milwaukee and Indiana-
polis, for example, most exiles quickly adjusted to their new 
occupations and regained their former Cuban status43. On average, 
Cubans have higher incomes, educational levels, and occupational 
skills in states like Illinois and California than in Florida and New 
Jersey. Unfortunately, little detailed information is available for Cuban 
communities outside the main centers of the diaspora44. 
Aside from Dade County, Florida, the New York metropolitan 
area has the largest Cuban population in the United States. In 1990, 
over 57 000 Cubans lived in New York City alone. Prior to the 
Revolution, Cubans were the second most numerous Latino group in 
New York City, after Puerto Ricans. Since 1959, many Cubans 
continued to move to New York and settled primarily in Washington 
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43. Portes, « Dilemmas of a Golden Exile », op. cit. ; Casal Lourdes and 
Hernández Andrés R., « Cubans in the United States : A Review of the Literature », 
Cuban Studies/Estudios cubanos 5, n° 2, 1975, pp. 25-51. 
44. See Amalia Lucía Cabezas, « The Cuban Community in Los Angeles », paper 
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Heights, in northwest Manhattan. By 1970, the majority of New York 
Cubans lived in upper-middle class neighborhoods like Jackson 
Heights in Queens45.  
Wherever they reside, Cuban-Americans exhibit a lack of social 
integration with other Hispanic immigrants such as Puerto Ricans and 
Dominicans. They are often physically removed from other minorities 
because they tend to live in the suburbs of metropolitan areas, whereas 
the latter are largely confined to inner-city districts. Even when they 
share the same neighborhoods, as in Washington Heights, Latinos 
usually cross national lines only in public places such as parks, 
schools, markets, and churches46. In the last three decades, Cubans 
have been moving out of New York and New Jersey and into Florida, 
as part of a resettlement pattern characteristic of the entire Cuban 
population in the United States. 
The Cuban Middleman Minority in Puerto Rico 
Compared to the two major Cuban communities in the United 
States, the Cubans of Puerto Rico are a small population – 19 736 
persons or less than two percent of all the émigrés in 1990. But they 
deserve special attention because they display yet another adaptive 
strategy among Cubans in exile. The Cubans who moved to San Juan 
were even more over-representative of the propertied classes in their 
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country of origin than those who moved to the U.S. mainland. For 
example, the Cuban-born population in Puerto Rico has a much larger 
share of upper-status workers, such as managers and professionals, 
than in the U.S. mainland (see Table 3). Cuban immigrants also have 
higher income and educational levels than the Puerto Rican-born 
population. And they tend to live in upper-middle class neighborhoods 
within the San Juan metropolitan area47. 
 
Table 3 
Occupational distribution of Cubans in the United States and 
Puerto Rico, 1990 (in percentages) 
 
Occupation United States Puerto Rico 
Managerial and professional 20,4 36,2 
Technical, sales, and administrative support 33,4 42,7 
Precision production, craft, and repair 12,3 8,5 
Operators, fabricators, and laborers 8,0 5,1 
Service 14,9 5,9 
Farming, forestry, and fishing 1,0 1,6 
Total 100,0 100,0 
 
Sources : U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1990 Census of the Population of the 
United States ; 1990 Census of Population and Housing : Social and Economic 
Characteristics, Puerto Rico. 
Cubans in San Juan come predominantly from Havana, 
Santiago, and other major Cuban cities. Prior to the Revolution, most 
of them were employed in the service sector of those urban centers, 
primarily as white-collar workers such as professionals and managers. 
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Many émigrés had entrepreneurial experience in Cuba ; some took 
capital and marketable skills to Puerto Rico. To a large extent, their 
economic adaptation depended on their ability to transfer past 
resources, both economic and social, to a new environment. For 
example, many early refugees established credit with U.S. banks with 
which they had conducted business in Cuba. Others formed commer-
cial partnerships with friends and relatives who had moved to San 
Juan. Although many exiles suffered an initial loss of occupational 
status in Puerto Rico, most regained it within a single decade. In brief, 
an important sector of the Cuban petty bourgeoisie was reconstituted in 
San Juan between 1960 and 1970. 
The Cubans of Puerto Rico function primarily as a middleman 
minority, a culturally distinctive group specializing in the selling of 
goods and services within the host society. Like other middleman 
minorities, Cubans entered the middle and higher levels of commerce 
and in some cases virtually monopolized entire sectors of trade and 
services, such as small shops, bakeries, food retailing, the mass media, 
real estate, and advertising. They gained a special access to 
occupations that were either above the reach of the majority of the 
Puerto Rican population or beneath the dignity of the local elite, filling 
a status gap between dominant and subaltern classes. Like other 
middleman minorities, Cubans in Puerto Rico are almost exclusively 
urban dwellers ; unlike ethnic enclaves, they do not concentrate 
spatially in a single residential district. Nor do they focus on an ethnic 
market, like Cubans in Miami, but rather cater to the larger economy. 
Finally, in contrast to the situation in south Florida, Cuban enterprises 
in San Juan tend to employ a majority of non-Cubans, except in 
positions of trust. 
Cubans’ incorporation into the Puerto Rican labor market has 
been different from other locales in the U.S. mainland. While Cubans 
in Miami have established an economic enclave, those in West New 
York-Union City have developed a working-class community, and 
others have been absorbed into the primary labor market, Cubans in 
Puerto Rico have assumed a distinctive commercial and entre-
preneurial role. They have invested most of their capital and labor in 
retail trade and business services, primarily as managers, adminis-
trators, sales and clerical workers. Most work for themselves, for their 
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compatriots, or for other foreigners. In sum, Cubans in San Juan fit the 
occupational profile of a middleman minority. 
The comparison between Cubans in Puerto Rico and in the U.S. 
mainland suggests that linguistic and cultural factors can shape 
immigrants’ socioeconomic incorporation. Among other things, Cuba 
and Puerto Rico share a tropical insular geography, a common colonial 
history dominated by Spain, an Afro-Caribbean cultural heritage, a 
predominantly Catholic religion, and a Creole dialect of the Spanish 
language. Such similarities have made Cubans’ adaptation to Puerto 
Rico much easier than in the United States. In contrast, Cuban-
Americans have faced a predominantly white, Anglo-Saxon, and 
Protestant establishment. Hence, the ethnic boundaries between 
Americans and Cubans are much sharper than the ones dividing 
Cubans from Puerto Ricans. Such cultural differences such be explored 
further as contributing causes of the various paths followed by the 
Cuban diaspora48.  
To recapitulate, the Cuban migrant experience differs widely 
from place to place. In Miami, Cubans have created an institutionally 
complete community that provides an alternative to the secondary 
labor market as well as to mainstream American culture. In West New 
York-Union City, they have formed a tight ethnic community that has 
facilitated their adjustment to the new society. In Puerto Rico, the 
Cuban middleman minority shows signs of increasing assimilation 
through intermarriage and cultural interpenetration. Elsewhere, the 
exiles have quickly integrated to the occupational structure and cultural 
identity of the United States. In short, the Cuban exodus varies greatly 
across space as well as time and should not be generalized from the 
unique case of Miami. 
 
                                                          
48. I have developed these points elsewhere, for the case of Cubans in Puerto 
Rico. See Duany Jorge, « Two Wings of the Same Bird ? Contemporary Puerto Rican 
Attitudes Toward Cuban Immigrants ? », unpublished manuscript, Department of 
Sociology and Anthropology, University of Puerto Rico, Río Piedras, 1997. 
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THE CURRENT SOCIOECONOMIC PROFILE OF  
THE CUBAN-AMERICAN POPULATION 
The most recent Census data allow a comparison of the basic 
characteristics of Cubans, other Hispanics, and non-Hispanics in the 
United States (see Table 4). The data reveal striking differences and 
some similarities among the three groups. Compared to the other two 
groups, the Cuban population is much older, has more males than 
females, and has a larger percentage of married couples. On most 
counts, Cubans resemble more closely the non-Hispanic population 
than the Hispanic population. For instance, Cubans have fewer female-
headed households, are better educated, have lower unemployment 
rates, earn higher incomes, and have a lower poverty level than other 
Hispanics. Thus, Cuban-Americans are a relatively advantaged group 
among U.S. Latinos. They also fare well in comparison to other 
minorities, such as African-Americans and Asian Americans49. 
 
Table 4 
Selected socioeconomic characteristics of cubans,  
all hispanics, and non-hispanics in the united states, 1997 
Characteristic Cubans All Hispanics 
Non-
Hispanicsa 
Median age 40,8 26,1 35,5 
Percent female 46,5 48,7 51,3 
Percent married 57,3 53,8 56,6 
Percent female-headed households 12,5 19,7 12,0 
Percent completed high school 65,2 54,7 84,8 
Median earnings in 1996, females ($) 16 356,0 11 830,0 16 459,0 
Percent below poverty level in 1996 17,3 29,4 11,8 
 
 
                                                          
49. See the data collected by the U.S. Census Bureau, 1997 Current Population 
Survey, op. cit. 
98 Jorge DUANY 
 
 
 
 
PDLC n° 11, 1999 
(continued) 
 
Characteristic Cubans All Hispanics 
Non-
Hispanicsa 
Percent completed college 19,7 10,3 25,2 
Percent unemployed 6,1 9,2 5,2 
Median earnings in 1996, males ($) 22 650,0 16 284,0 26 943,0 
 
a
 Includes both whites and blacks of non-Hispanic origin. 
Source : U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1997 Current Population Survey. 
Most sociological and anthropological studies of Cuban exiles 
have highlighted their socioeconomic success in the United States and 
Puerto Rico. In a recent review of the literature, Silvia Pedraza50 noted 
three prevalent lines of explanation for this success : the privileged 
class origins of early Cuban migrants, leading to the creation of an 
enclave economy in Miami ; the definition of Cuban exiles as political 
refugees by the U.S. government ; and the unusually high participation 
of Cuban women in the U.S. labor force. Each of these explanations 
stresses the distinctive characteristics of Cuban exiles vis-à-vis other 
immigrants, especially Latinos in the United States. Because of this 
emphasis on the exiles’ unique success, important facets of the Cuban-
American experience have been overlooked. Among other issues, the 
persistence of social inequality within Cuban communities in the 
United States has not been adequately researched51. 
Returning to Table 4, several problematic trends can be 
identified. In 1997, fully one-third of the Cuban-American population 
had not completed high school, compared to less than one-third among 
the non-Hispanic population. Similarly, less than one-fifth of the 
Cubans had finished college, compared to one-fourth of the non-
 
                                                          
50. Pedraza Silvia, « Cubans in Exile, 1959-1989 : The State of the Research », in 
Fernández Damián J. (ed), Cuban Studies since the Revolution, Gainesville, University 
Press of Florida, 1992, pp. 235-257. 
51. An exception to this trend is Valdés Paz Juan and Hernández Rafael, « La 
estructura de clases de la comunidad cubana en los Estados Unidos », Cuadernos de 
Nuestra América 1 (1983), pp. 5-35. 
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Hispanics. Furthermore, unemployment and poverty rates were much 
higher for Cubans than for non-Hispanics. Finally, median earnings 
among Cuban males were substantially lower than among non-
Hispanic males, and slightly lower among Cuban females than among 
non-Hispanic females. The available data suggest that most Cubans 
have not yet bridged the gap with the general population of the United 
States. 
Moreover, the overall statistics of the Cuban-American 
population hide significant internal cleavages. Although Cubans 
approximate the national income, occupational, and educational norms, 
economic success remains a mirage for many of them. In 1997, nearly 
one-fourth of the émigrés earned less than $ 10 000 and over one-sixth 
lived under the poverty level. Less than one-fourth of all Cuban-
Americans held high-status jobs such as managers and professionals ; 
almost half were part of the lower strata of operators, laborers, and 
service workers. Finally, more than one-fifth had less than an eighth 
grade education52. These figures do not agree well with the rags-to-
riches stories that one commonly finds in journalistic reports on Cuban 
migrants. 
On the contrary, many Cubans have suffered a loss of occupatio-
nal status or have undergone a process of proletarianization in the 
United States. It is not unusual to find a Cuban lawyer selling used cars 
in Miami, or a trained teacher working as a seamstress in a West New 
York factory. When the marielitos and balseros are brought into the 
picture, the success stories of self-made Cuban businessmen become 
more scanty. As I have shown, these last two migrant waves consisted 
of people with less educational and occupational skills than the first 
two waves ; they looked more and more like traditional labor migrants 
in search of higher standards of living. Even before Mariel, the émigré 
population of lower class extraction had increased as a result of 
continuing material scarcity in Cuba. 
In sum, Cuban exiles are located at all levels of the U.S. occupa-
tional structure ; they come from all sectors of their home society ; 
 
                                                          
52. U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1997 Current Population Survey, op. cit. 
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they are a heterogeneous group economically, socially, and politically 
as well. This profile renders simplistic class explanations of the exodus 
grossly inadequate. The retired aged couple living modestly in Little 
Havana is no less typical of Cuban Americans than the well-to-do 
family living in plush Coral Gables. It is a mistake to think of Cuban 
migration exclusively as a white urban elite of ideologically conserva-
tive exiles. Extreme right-wing organizations such as the Cuban-
American National Foundation do not adequately represent the views 
of most Cubans in Miami and elsewhere53. As I argued before, it is 
equally wrong to hold that the ethnic enclave in Miami is the dominant 
form of incorporation for Cuban immigrants in the United States. The 
Miami enclave is certainly the most prominent Cuban-American 
community, but it is by no means the only one, nor can its characteris-
tics be easily extrapolated to other Cuban settlements in New Jersey, 
New York, Puerto Rico, and elsewhere. 
CONCLUSION 
To restate my main thesis, the legend of the Golden Exile does 
not do justice to the complex and diverse experiences of Cubans in the 
United States. Although much has been written about Cuban refugees, 
a good deal of it has been biased and inaccurate. The U.S. mass media 
and some academic researchers have tended to perceive the immigrants 
as a modern-day version of the American dream. Because they flee a 
Communist regime – the last one in the western hemisphere –, Cuban 
exiles have often been portrayed as noble heroes caught in the Cold 
War between Cuba and the United States. As a general rule, they have 
been praised for their entrepreneurial spirit, work ethic, and thirst for 
 
                                                          
53. For instance, recent public opinion polls show that a growing proportion of 
Cubans in Miami advocates some form of dialogue with the Cuban government, 
although many continue to support the tightening of the U.S. trade embargo against 
Cuba. See Grenier Guillermo J., Gladwin Hugh and McLaughlin Douglas, Views on 
Policy Options Toward Cuba Held by Cuban-American Residents of Dade County : 
The Results of the Second 1991 Cuba Poll, Miami, Institute of Public Opinion 
Research and Cuban Research Institute, Florida International University, 1992. 
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freedom, as well as their leading role in the conversion of Miami from 
a quiet tourist resort into a booming trading and financial center. With 
some variations on a recurring theme, the Cuban success story has 
been told and retold in many influential academic, policy-making, and 
journalistic circles. 
However, recent research on the Cuban population in the United 
States does not support the idealized image of the Golden Exile. First 
of all, most Cuban-Americans are not wealthy, well-educated, and 
highly skilled, especially when compared with non-Hispanics. Nor 
have they been without problems in adjusting to life in the United 
States. Cuban-Americans share the difficulties of many other 
immigrant groups, such as learning a new language, overcoming ethnic 
discrimination, gaining access to public services, organizing them-
selves as a pressure group, reconstructing family ties, and forging a 
new cultural identity. Secondly, the Cuban exodus during the past four 
decades has followed the changing fortunes of the Cuban Revolution 
and its relations with the United States. As I have argued throughout 
this article, successive migration waves drew deeper into the middle 
and lower strata of Cuban society. Whereas the early refugees came 
predominantly from the privileged classes of pre-revolutionary Cuba, 
many marielitos and balseros came from the disadvantaged sectors of 
post-revolutionary society. As the Cuban government itself recognized 
(although using derogatory terms), the gusanos (worms) of the first 
waves became the escoria (scum) after Mariel.  
Finally, U.S. policy toward Cuban migration has changed 
dramatically over the last forty years. As the title of a recent book on 
the topic notes, Cubans were transformed from « welcome exiles » in 
the 1960s to « illegal migrants » in the 1990s54. The long-term impact 
of this policy shift on the Cuban-American population remains unclear. 
A prominent sociologist, Lisandro Pérez, has predicted « the end of 
 
                                                          
54. Masud-Piloto Félix, « From Welcome Exiles to Illegal Migrants : Cuban 
Migration to the U.S. », 1959-1995, Lanham, Md., Rowman and Littlefield, 1996. 
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exile » as it is now known among Cubans in the United States55. 
Current trends suggest that Cuban-Americans are making the 
ideological transition from political refugees to an ethnic minority 
group56. Should this pattern continue, Cubans will no longer perceive 
themselves as unique, exceptional, or radically distinct from other 
Latino or Caribbean immigrants in the United States. Clearly, they 
have lost the symbolic value they once had for the federal government 
during the heyday of the Cold War against Communism. 
 
 
 
 
 
Résumé 
 
Cet article aborde les 
principales phases de la migration 
cubaine vers les Etats-Unis au XXe 
siècle, spécialement après 1959, et 
retrace ses origines historiques au 
XIXe siècle. L’auteur insiste sur 
l’évolution des caractéristiques socio-
économiques des émigrés ainsi que 
sur leur répartition spatiale aux Etats-
Unis. Il montre que les émigrés sont 
devenus, au cours des quatre dernières 
décennies, de plus en plus représen-
tatifs de la société cubaine, du point 
de vue des revenus, de l’emploi et de 
l’instruction, mais pas en ce qui 
concerne la race ou la couleur et la 
région d’origine : ils sont prioritaire-
ment blancs et urbains. La seconde 
 Abstract 
 
This article sketches the 
principal migration waves from Cuba 
to the United States during the 
twentieth century, especially since 
1959, and traces their historical 
background in the nineteenth century. 
The author focuses on the changing 
socioeconomic characteristics of the 
migrants over time as well as their 
spatial distribution within the United 
States. He shows that, throughout the 
past four decades, the émigrés have 
become more and more representative 
of Cuban society with regard to 
income, occupation, and education 
(but not so much with regard to race 
or color and region of origin – they 
are still predominantly white and 
 
                                                          
55. Pérez Lisandro, « ¿ Fin del exilio cubano ? », paper presented at the XX 
International Congress of the Latin American Studies Association, Guadalajara, 
Mexico, April 17-19, 1997. 
56. See Duany Jorge, « Neither Golden Exile nor Dirty Worm : Ethnic Identity in 
Recent Cuban-American Novels », Cuban Studies 23, 1993, pp. 167-183. 
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partie de cet essai analyse les 
différences et similitudes entre le 
mode d’incorporation des Cubains à 
Miami, West New York-Union City, 
San Juan et d’autres villes. En 
particulier, l’auteur estime que c’est 
une erreur que de considérer l’enclave 
ethnique de Miami comme un modèle 
de l’expérience de tous les Cubains en 
exil. La dernière partie du travail 
examine brièvement le profil 
socioéconomique de la population 
cubaine aux Etats-Unis pour conclure 
que les images stéréotypées de son 
succès au plan matériel ne trouve 
guère confirmation dans la recherche 
académique. Au contraire, les cubain-
américains font face à plusieurs défis 
communs à d’autres immigrants 
récents aux Etats-Unis et ailleurs. 
Parmi ces défis, il y a la question de 
l’identité culturelle hybride, laquelle 
maintient des liaisons transnationales 
entre le pays natal et le pays 
d’adoption.  
 
urban). The second part of this article 
analyzes the differences and simila-
rities in the settlement patterns of 
Cubans in Miami, West New York-
Union City, San Juan, and other 
cities. In particular, the author argues 
that it is a mistake to take the ethnic 
enclave in Miami as the prototype for 
the experiences of all Cubans in exile. 
The last section of the essay briefly 
examines the socioeconomic profile of 
the Cuban population in the United 
States and concludes that stereotyped 
images of its material success have 
little basis on academic research. 
Instead, Cuban-Americans face many 
of the same challenges as other recent 
immigrants in the United States and 
elsewhere. Among these challenges is 
the question of developing a hybrid 
cultural identity that maintains 
transnational linkages to the home-
land as well as to the adopted 
country.  
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